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In a recent issue of the Journal of Research Practice (Volume 1, Issue 1, 2005), Paul 
Grobstein proposed a new way of viewing science. He argued that science should be 
considered as story telling and story revising, which creates an interesting twist to the 
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traditional science/humanities dichotomy. The paper’s Popperian approach argues that 
scientific research should be open to critical examination by everyone, rather than just 
scientists, allowing for revisions to the accepted truth of the moment. Such an approach 
can be considered only a positive step at a time when many disciplines are finding 
themselves questioning their conventional role and ideologies. Globalisation and rapid 
social and technological change have forced many established disciplines to rethink their 
traditional research approach, and to challenge the way knowledge is thought of, studied, 
and communicated in the information age.  
The fundamental argument of Grobstein’s paper is three-fold: First, that science and 
culture should be considered complementary forces, not competing ones, and that science 
should recognise the impact culture has upon it in terms of influencing the theories 
constructed and the evidence gathered (and vice versa). Second, that there should be a 
larger role for critical examination of science and scientific theory, that science should 
not be taught as the truth, but the total sum of knowledge at that particular moment--that 
is, being able to revise the story. Third, that the traditionally accepted roles of scientist 
and non-scientist should be challenged (for the purpose of this paper, scientist or science 
refers to the natural and physical sciences, and non-scientist refers to history or 
humanities scholars).  
As someone who has an academic background in history and information science, 
Grobstein’s paper has a resonance with my own research experiences as a non-scientist. 
History has been accepted as a story or narrative since Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the 
Roman Empire in the eighteenth century and grand narratives are no less popular in the 
twenty-first century. For David Starkey, “history, fundamentally, is a branch of 
storytelling [albeit] a very sophisticated branch of storytelling” (Starkey, 2005). Recently 
there have been calls from members of the field for there to be a renewed emphasis on 
story telling within history, on content rather than skills, and for a reconsideration of how 
history is taught and researched (Friedman, 2005; Starkey, 2005; Stearns, 2005)--in other 
words, calls to revise the story, or the best way of telling it.  
Without wishing to get into the somewhat passé debate about whether history is a science 
or an art, Grobstein’s theory suggests some links between history and science which are 
worth exploring. If science, as Grobstein sees it, is conceived of as “a central component 
of a human culture” (p. 1), and history is, essentially, the study of past human culture, we 
begin to see that the two are actually much more closely aligned. Showing science to be a 
narrative form offers an interesting point for comparing the two disciplines. Further to 
this, and more significantly, Grobstein suggests that the development of science--what to 
study, which data to analyze--is much more closely related to contemporary human 
culture than has previously been recognised (more on this later). For historians, it has 
long been recognised that the contemporary context influences such decisions in 
historical research. Grobstein calls for science to recognise its inherent subjectivity and 
acknowledge to the wider public that science is fallible.  
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Like history, science is about induction--making general theories from observed data--but 
it is often presented as being analytically true, when it is not. Historians have long been 
aware of this subjectivity and have argued, as Grobstein does here, that it is a strength 
rather than a weakness of research practice. The purpose of drawing such links is to show 
that in our current age when disciplinary borders are becoming increasingly blurred, what 
may be effective research practice for one discipline may have some useful insights for 
another. As Grobstein notes, such a theory will lead to “a very substantial blurring of the 
borders between those who think of themselves as scientists and those who think of 
themselves as something else” (p. 2). This paper attempts to provide a non-scientist 
perspective.  
1. The Information Age: A Need for Global Stories? 
Grobstein proposes the “rethinking of the role of science in culture and hence of culture 
itself” (p. 2). In order to do this (and even more so when considering the relevance to 
history which is irrevocably linked to human culture), we must begin by considering what 
is deemed to be culturally significant in the twenty-first century. Grobstein does not 
discuss the implications of the most considerable aspect of contemporary human culture, 
that is, the period of change and transition in which we are currently living. Technology 
has advanced hugely in the last few decades, revolutionising communication and 
knowledge infrastructures. All sorts of socio-economic and political issues have emerged 
alongside, or as a result of, such new values and ways of living. Traditionally accepted 
ways of research and thinking of knowledge more generally have been challenged both in 
terms of methodological practice and relevance of subject matter.  
Culture has an influence on both the demands of science and how scientists themselves 
choose what to research and how to research it. The same is true of history and historians, 
as in any period of flux there are calls to justify how we arrived here, how the change 
happened, and these are made richer by a diversity of stories. The type of story currently 
being demanded is changing within the environment of the information age. Stories of 
any kind are not, after all, discovered or told within a vacuum, but form part of culture 
themselves. Just as Grobstein argues that “the evolution of understandings of science is 
too important to be left solely in the hands of a closed community of scientists” (p. 4), 
historian Jeremy Black (2005) believes that “the past ... is too valuable to be left to 
scholars. Instead it provides subjects, themes and evidence” with which humanity can 
engage and absorb into our culture, as it does science.  
However, culture in the information age is no longer restricted to geographic boundaries, 
and as Jill Vickers has argued, “globalization challenges how academic work is 
organized” (2003, p. 2), and contributes to the growth in inter-disciplinary research as 
communication and the sharing of resources and ideas with colleagues around the globe 
has become radically faster and easier. The role of technology “in reshaping culture and 
ways of seeing” has been discussed by Rohan McWilliam (2005, p. 19) in a historical 
capacity, but the same applies to any discipline, as new dialogues and questions about 
humanity are discussed in broader and more accessible forums. Any opportunity to 
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present stories which are more inclusive and consider a broader world picture than 
western Christian civilisation surely has to be a good thing. As traditional geographical 
and cultural boundaries become less of a barrier, new stories have emerged and thus 
challenged and revised existing notions of knowledge. The historical trend towards world 
history for example, shows no signs of slowing, and recently there have been calls for 
more interaction between established social history and this newer dialogue, both of 
which “have substantially altered the way the past is defined and the way it is related to 
the present” (Stearns, 2005).  
We have begun, for example, to see new histories on the African poor, on children in 
Latin America (Hecht, 2002; Iliffe, 1990)--new stories, or revisions to existing ones, in 
the light of new phenomena and ways of thinking. Such histories surely promote the “less 
divisive and more widely engaging story” that Grobstein (p. 4) wants for human culture. 
The fact that more interdisciplinary researchers can access and comment on these 
histories through e-mail, and Internet discussion forums ensures that they are questioned 
and challenged, and where necessary, revised. Indeed, “the more people, the more 
observations, the more stories the better” (p. 11). Admittedly, historical stories are not 
quite the same as the scientific “summaries of observations” which Grobstein discusses 
(p. 11), but history (as opposed to the past) is essentially a historian’s concise summary of 
historical evidence.  
Consequently, the idea that the more people contribute the better, holds true whether you 
are talking about observed data or access to historical material and sources. The easier it 
is for people to access and share stories of any kind, the richer the material we ultimately 
have to mine. Leary (2005) discusses how he has used the Internet in his research on the 
Victorians to facilitate this kind of discussion and he provides an anecdote of how the 
Internet brought in touch the descendent, biographer, and other scattered family members 
of the nineteenth century author Letitia Elizabeth Landon. Such story sharing allowed for 
biographical information to be brought into the public domain for the first time in 170 
years. Certainly this is not a unique experience and Leary believes that “fortuitous 
electronic connections, and the information that circulates through them, are emerging as 
hallmarks of humanities scholarship in the digital age” (2005, p. 2). The Web and e-mail 
now allows for story telling, sharing, and revising to take place on a global scale.  
This is not restricted to the historical community of course. The wider public can more 
easily access such stories since they can be disseminated digitally into classrooms or 
homes, where “the collection of observations and creation of stories in open forums ... 
can be used and criticized by others” (p. 11). Grobstein quotes from the Serendip forum 
(a post 9/11 discussion area for “the sharing of thoughts and perspectives about those 
events and their meaning for our individual and collective lives”) where he suggests that:  
Science has the potential to be what we all collectively need as we evolve 
into a world wide community: a nexus point that encourages and supports 
the evolution of shared human stories of exploration and growth, an 
evolution in which all human beings are involved and take pride. (p. 4)  
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Why should such a community, such shared human stories, be limited and confined to 
science? Surely this is only promoting the sense of science being “a specialized or 
privileged activity” (p. 1) that Grobstein criticizes.  
Arguably the layman (as opposed to professional) in history plays a more direct role than 
in science--people are better able to provide historical sources in the form of letters, 
diaries, pictures, and so forth (as the case of Letitia Elizabeth Langdon illustrates), than 
they are able to provide scientific evidence or facts. However, the public themselves form 
part of the culture in which scientists are operating and can directly influence what the 
scientists pursue (or do not pursue). Consumer purchasing power and public protest plays 
a key role in the use of animals in scientific testing, for example. The way scientists can 
use animals has been controlled by legislation in the UK since 1822 and many companies 
opt for products tested with alternative methods. Many research projects depend on 
public volunteers providing personal information or being the subject of tests themselves, 
for their ground data--such as the Breakthrough Generations project at the Institute of 
Cancer Research.  
The public do play different roles in the shaping of history and of science, but such 
cultural influences are necessary ones for developing the stories of both disciplines. As 
has already been argued, the developments in technology and a more global awareness 
should, if anything, facilitate the sharing of interdisciplinary stories, of stories about 
humanity--where we have come from, how we got here, as well as where we may be 
going.  
2. Scientific Method versus Historical Method 
For Grobstein, a scientific hypothesis:  
is nothing more (and nothing less) than a useful way to summarize 
observations ... More importantly, it characterizes the observations in 
terms of some underlying pattern of principle that yields to predictions 
about future observations. In this very real sense, the summary is a story--
a way to make sense of observations made to date that provide a guide for 
future behaviour. And like all stories, it is inherently provisional. (p. 6)  
Thinking of historical theory as “a useful way to summarize observations” is equally 
valid as when applied to scientific theory. Fundamentally, the past is gone and 
irretrievable, but history is a historian’s interpretation of contemporary sources and 
empirical data. It would be impossible for anyone to know everything about what has 
happened in humanity’s past and so historians summarise and interpret only a small part 
of the whole, which is constantly open to revision. Collectively, they contribute to, and 
form, a dynamic human history.  
However, history does not attempt to predict the future and indeed there are very real 
dangers associated with using historical consciousness in this way. Christopher Andrew 
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has argued the danger of military intelligence attitudes of the post 9/11 era is its tendency 
to rely on short term historical trends to explain current terrorist behaviour, rather than 
realising that fanaticism has very long historical traditions. “Little of real importance 
about future trends ... can be deduced from the study of a mere generation of human 
experience” (Andrew, 2004), instead, one needs to be aware of older trends, or stories. 
While such stories can be used in attempts to understand the present, they can also be 
misused, or only part of the story told. Historian Jeremy Black suggests that a partisan 
view of history is too often used by “polemicists, many of whom are involved in myth-
making.” He gives the example of attempts to create a new story of European identity in 
order to promote the European Union (Black, 2005)--historical stories with a political 
agenda, selective of the history used in their cause.  
Few professional historians attempt to predict events in the future in this way. History is 
unlike science in that no set of historical conditions can ever be replicated exactly--in 
many situations, we are not even certain of what those conditions actually were; it is the 
job of the historian to understand and uncover as best one can. Historians cannot predict 
future events, but they can philosophise about where humanity might be heading. History 
is more suited to philosophical and ideological prediction, such as Marxist ideals of 
classlessness, or Fukuyama’s end of history position that globalisation has caused such a 
decline in cultural barriers that any future events will be perfectly understood within our 
existing framework of understanding (Fukuyama, 1992).  
However, one of history’s greatest strengths is that we can extract patterns and themes 
from the past to try to explain contemporary human behaviour or cultural climate, or in 
order to learn from the mistakes (or successes) of the past. In doing so, we add to the 
bigger story of human development. Revising the story for each generation is part of the 
process of our understanding. The emergence of information history and digital history in 
the last decade, for example, has to a great extent been down to a reinterpretation of 
history, based upon the contemporary values and concerns of the information society 
(Black, 1998; Weller, 2005). Alternatively, Hugh Small’s (1998) book used letters by 
Florence Nightingale, which had been previously unseen by her biographers, to challenge 
the accepted explanations for her attitude towards sanitation reform. In both these 
examples, parts of the historical story have been revised by the kind of “critical 
examination of our understandings” that Grobstein advocates in science (p. 2).  
Both scientific and historical method examine evidence (in whatever form) so as to be “a 
continual and recursive process of story testing” (p. 6). Neither can validate universal 
claims of knowledge in the Popperian sense, and both can have theories or hypotheses 
overturned by new evidence. Scientific method is based upon controlled observation, 
whereas historical method is based upon more subjective and personal interpretations of 
historical sources, and yet, as Grobstein argues, the choices behind what scientists 
observe and what they deem as relevant are just as subjective. Evidence--scientific data 
or historical sources--is valueless until it is interpreted.  
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That is not to say the results of such inquiry are any less valid, as “issues of evidence, 
issues of critical analysis, issues of debate” are crucial to practicing good history 
(Starkey, 2005). Historical subjectivity and analysis is paralleled by what Grobstein terms 
the “crack” in scientific method:  
There is always more than one possible summary/story that will fit any 
given set of observations ... And so there is always a choice (conscious or 
unconscious) to further pursue one or another way of several alternative 
ways of making sense of the world. It is through this crack that science is 
perhaps most strongly affected by the individual temperament and cultural 
background of its practitioners. (p. 7)  
Scientific paradigms are commonly regarded as being less subjective than historical 
theories. Grobstein acknowledges that there are measurable ways to reduce subjectivity in 
science, and yet there is no escaping the fact that scientists are not acting within a 
vacuum--they form part of humanity, and consequently science itself develops as part of 
a broader human culture and not as an independent entity. Grobstein argues that “as 
science evolves, it is entering realms where human perspectives ... appear increasingly to 
be unavoidably (and perhaps even desirably) intertwined with much of what is being 
explored” (p. 12). In other words, when Grobstein comments, “what is being tested in 
scientific method is necessarily not only the nature of things being investigated but also 
the stories chosen to further investigate them” (p. 7), he is essentially making the same 
point about scientists as historians have long accepted about themselves: that you are a 
product of your own society and this will always influence what you chose to research 
and how you chose to research it, irrelevant of the story itself.  
The emergence of digital history and information history in the last decade is a good 
example of such an influence. It is no coincidence that these new interpretations or stories 
have appeared at the same time as digital and information technologies have become 
increasingly immersed in everyday life. The dominant themes of the information age 
have led to a revising of existing historical stories, in much the same way that the rise of 
the civil rights and feminist movements were in some degree mirrored by revisions to 
historical understanding by historians’ interest in minority and women’s histories 
(Weller, 2005). Jon Agar and Edward Higgs have recently published histories of the 
Government Machine and the Information State, which are essentially revisions of stories 
on the role central government plays (or should not play) in the collection of data on its 
citizens in the light of contemporary concerns over ID cards, data protection, and public 
surveillance (Agar, 2003; Higgs, 2004). Revisions have also been made to stories 
discussing the role and conceptualisation of information and knowledge in society, as 
these themes have become more prominent in everyday culture (Black, 1995, 1998; 
Burke, 2004; Weller & Bawden, in press).  
Therefore, subjectivity (or, the crack as Grobstein describes it) can be viewed as a 
positive generator of new observations and new stories by examining contemporary 
cultural values and behaviour. Indeed, within the discipline, a historian’s perspective is 
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not regarded as a limit to their objectivity, but instead, it can be seen as a positive--a way 
of distancing oneself from the period or issues in question and adding something new 
from another perspective.  
The term crack is also used in a similar way to Grobstein by Keith Jenkins in his seminal 
book Re-thinking History:
Querying the notion of the historian’s truth, pointing to the variable 
facticity of facts, insisting that historians write the past from ideological 
positions, stressing that history is a written discourse as liable to 
deconstruction as any other ... all these things destabilize the past and 
fracture it, so that, in the cracks opened up, new histories can be made. 
(Jenkins, 1991, p. 66)  
The concept of the crack, of subjectivity, of context affecting interpretation, whether in 
historical or scientific method, all support the idea that there is more than one story of 
human culture, none of which is constrained by disciplinary boundaries or scholarly 
communities, which seems to be the very point Grobstein is trying to make.  
However, just because there is more than one story does not mean that every story is 
equally valid. There is an important issue of whether all theories deserve equal credence 
and whether all people are suited to tell stories, or challenge them. Grobstein does not 
address this question, seeming to support the idea that the opinion of the layman is as 
valid to scientific development as those of trained scientists. He suggests that science as 
story telling:  
can and should be an activity in which all human beings are engaged in 
one way or another ... stories that draw from the observations and stories 
of all humans, and are both useful for and challengeable by all. (p. 13)  
This is not a convincing case as it does not take into consideration media manipulation, 
personal and political motives, or intentional misuse of evidence (such as the examples of 
military intelligence and European polemicists discussed above). Recent debates about 
the validity of “intelligent design” as a scientific hypothesis concerning the origin of life, 
has led in particular to a debate about what makes a credible scientific theory and on the 
other hand what is more a case of popular propaganda or pressure (Dawkins & Coyne, 
2005). In itself, the emergence of this debate at a time when the articulation of religious 
views is particularly sensitive is a good example of contemporary culture impacting upon 
the issues scientists choose as relevant and important to discuss. The fundamental point 
that Dawkins and Coyne are arguing is that, for any theory you need to be able to offer 
positive proof to support it, as opposed to simply pointing out the gaps in another.  
When applied to history, the same questions of equal validity arise. How are historical 
stories evaluated so that some are deemed acceptable, and others not? Can one give equal 
credence to the arguments of holocaust deniers, for example? Holocaust expert Deborah 
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Lipstadt exposed Holocaust denier David Irving as deliberately manipulating historical 
evidence in order to refute that the Holocaust happened and to advance his anti-Semitic 
and white supremacist ideology. In 2000, Irving took her to court for libel although 
ultimately the judge ruled against him. The case showed the danger of distorting history 
to suit contemporary culture and personal subjectivity--in this case twentieth-century 
history in order to promote twenty first-century anti-Semitism and white supremacism. It 
also reinforced the importance of scholarship in sustaining historical truth. Some stories, 
therefore, can be unacceptable.  
To ensure valid and acceptable historical stories, research must be rigorous in its 
methodology, that is, internally coherent and consistent. It must also ensure that the 
evidence used have been checked back to their original sources and that any bias or 
ideological stance of the author (or indeed, the historian) has been acknowledged--as is 
argued here, subjectivity is not a negative thing in history, but a worldview must be 
stated. Any argument must be self-referencing, it must show where it fits into the existing 
literature, the accepted body of stories. Evidence must not be wilfully ignored, but 
explored and challenged and, if necessary, revisions must be made to stories in order to 
accommodate it. These criteria are neither formal nor exhaustive, yet they indicate how 
one historical story may be judged more acceptable than others. Issues of methodology 
are more crucial in history, since the critical analysis and interpretation of one historian is 
no more or less true than any another interpretation.  
This of course begs the question--what is truth, and what role does it play in history? 
Professional historians must of course endeavour to be accurate in their use of evidence, 
to ensure the provenance of material, and not be intentionally blind to sources which 
challenge their argument. But beyond these immediate concerns which give both the 
profession and historical research authority, truth is an ideological concept which itself 
changes depending on the cultural context--this idea is brilliantly articulated by Keith 
Jenkins in Re-thinking History (1991, pp. 28-32). Therefore, there are multiple truths 
according to your worldview and the way you choose to interpret, or place importance 
upon, particular sources. Grobstein himself recognises that his argument “derives in 
significant ways from aspects of my particular personality and of the particular cultural 
context in which I work. ... A different person, in a different time and place, might well 
tell a different story” (p. 14). History, as with Grobstein’s view of science, is made up of 
multiple truths. These truths, or stories, engage with the culture in which they are 
immersed at any one moment in time, all of which are susceptible to change, challenge, 
and revision.  
A further distinction can be made between the manner in which such revisions occur in 
history and in science. Historical revisions are more spatial and spontaneous than 
scientific ones, which tend to follow a more linear and temporal development. To 
contextualise this further, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and their historical 
predecessors Young Ireland, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, and the Fenians, have had 
differing stories in Ireland, England, and America, according to opposing moral and 
religious perspectives and sympathies. In some stories they appear as terrorists, in others, 
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freedom fighters. Each of these perspectives is equally valid (or invalid)--none can be 
proven correct or absolute. Revisions to the story have occurred recently in America, 
which has traditionally been sympathetic to the Irish cause. Post 9/11, perspectives 
changed as domestic terrorism took on a new cultural meaning. The revision occurred 
within an extremely short period of time, considering the story has otherwise been 
constant in the US since the mid-nineteenth century. However, the stories of Irish 
nationalism in England and Ireland were not really affected by the 9/11 attacks. Here 
science does differ from history. Challenges and revisions to long-accepted scientific 
paradigms do not tend to occur with such spatial variations. Kuhnian paradigm shifts 
(Kuhn, 1962), in their very nature, must affect the whole global community of scientists 
in order to be accepted as a revision to the story. Of course, this distinction is not absolute 
either, since historical revisions may also be linear. After all, historiography itself is in 
essence a linear progression of historical thought.  
Therefore, for history as for science, “without falsifying observations, stories would 
become static” (p. 6). Historical theories cannot be tested in the same way as scientific 
ones because events can never be recreated in exactly the same way, but they can be 
supported or challenged by the use of new historical evidence, or new ways of looking at 
existing evidence. While challenges to accepted views are unlikely to be replaced by a 
“better” story, as Grobstein suggests in scientific method (p. 6), as all historical stories 
are by their very nature somewhat subjective interpretations, revisions to the existing 
stories can, and do, result in more detailed understanding, alternative viewpoints, and 
new perspectives. The revision of historical stories leads to an alternative story, not 
necessarily a better one. And in any case, what one culture deems as useful and valid, 
another may not: stories are relative to the context in which they are being understood. 
However, whether the story under revision is historical or scientific, ultimately both 
become richer on account of “a progressively increasing number of observations, 
including ones that were adequately accounted for by a previous story and new ones that 
weren’t” (p. 7). The more facts, data, or evidence available, the more varied the ideas and 
conclusions become--although the process can be lengthy because “men are as much 
‘victims’ of their ideas as beneficiaries of them; traditions prevent men from seeing ... 
phenomena that an alternative tradition might lead them to confront” (Hollinger, 1980, p. 
201).  
3. Public Stories and Popular History 
Discussing science as a story allows for an increased public awareness and involvement 
with science, and helps dispel the fallacy that science is only for an elite group of men in 
white coats. For Grobstein, rousing curiosity and scepticism in a wider audience is the 
best way to engage with the world around us; for him, story telling allows new 
perceptions to emerge, new questions to be asked, and for knowledge to be more readily 
shared. There is much strength in this argument, especially as the technology around us 
continues to make it possible to share information and exchange ideas with colleagues or 
strangers across the world. The more people have the interest and ability to question and 
challenge scientific story, the faster (and “better”) the story can be revised.  
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These ideas can be equally applied to historical enquiry. Popular history has gained 
momentum in recent years with a growth in television documentaries and books making 
our past more accessible to the general public. The decision to make London museums 
free to enter and the utilisation of the Internet for virtual experiences, online resources, 
and discussion forums has also helped bring history closer to the general public 
awareness and experience. Digital technologies have not only opened up new fields of 
research questions, but they have also begun to change the practical ways in which 
history is taught and researched. Boonstra and others have looked at “historical 
information science,” in which “the object ... is historical information, and the various 
ways to create, design, enrich, edit, retrieve, analyse and present historical information 
with help of information technology” (Boonstra, Breure, & Doorn, 2004, p. 10). Patrick 
Leary (2005) has discussed the pros and cons for the historian in using the Internet as a 
research tool. Robertson (2004) and Friedman (2005) have observed the implications of 
using digital media to teach history in new and engaging ways, ranging from the use of 
computer-assisted presentation tools and visual information in the classroom to support 
traditional history lectures, to Robertson’s conception of “hypertext history,” in which 
Web-based technology is used to create an entirely new virtual historical experience.  
While anyone who practices history needs to have an ability to understand complex 
historical context, to be able to argue and weigh up evidence, and to think critically, these 
technological developments undoubtedly suggest new methods of telling historical 
stories. In this case, the way in which the story is being told is revised, rather than the 
content (or theory) of the story itself. Grobstein makes this point for scientific enquiry 
when he discusses E. O. Wilson’s concept that “the world is orderly and can be explained 
by a small number of natural laws” (as cited in Grobstein, 2005, p. 10):  
... it is a story telling style, one of many. Science should never become an 
advocate either of a particular story about things it is exploring or of any 
particular form of exploration. (p. 12)  
The power of science, or history, does not lie in any one form or method of story telling, 
but since “the underlying principle of skepticism, of continually questioning both stories 
and the styles in which they are told” (p. 12) is in essence formed and strengthened by the 
revision of stories, then multiple and new ways of telling any story is something that 
should be encouraged. Indeed, his recognition that scientific truth can, in effect, be no 
more absolute than historical truth leads to the conclusion that scientists need to embrace 
a diversity of stories, “to the view from everywhere, to stories that make most sense of 
the widest array of observations and stories made from unique and different perspectives” 
(p. 12). This is exactly what history has always striven towards.  
It has been argued here that the concept of human culture as an ongoing process of story 
telling and story revising is one that makes particular sense in the twenty-first century, as 
traditional geographic, cultural, and disciplinary boundaries grow weaker. While 
recognising that science and history are not the same, and necessarily so, there is much to 
be said for a common ideology of sharing and revising knowledge in order to support the 
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evolution of a richer, and more diverse, human culture and understanding about 
ourselves. The theory of story telling and story revising, whether scientific or historical, 
seems a positive step in this direction. This paper has attempted to offer an alternative 
story to that proposed by Grobstein, revising his story in the light of my historical 
knowledge. If these two stories can be considered a beginning to encourage others, 
perhaps a new discourse on the relationship between human knowledge, understanding, 
and culture can begin to be told.  
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